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NON–TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The concept of the profit-maximizing firm is a cornerstone of economic
analysis. A realistic model of firm behavior under uncertainty may assume
that the ultimate goal of a firm is to ensure long–term survival. In this frame-
work, firms are expected to hold liquid assets to mitigate future unfavorable
movements in the economy. For instance, Kester (1986), studying a sample of
452 US firms in 1983, reports that their average ratio of cash plus marketable
securities to total assets is 8.6%; later Kim et al. (1998) report an average of
8.1% for a sample of 915 US industrial firms over 1975–1994. What determines
the optimal amount of liquid assets that a firm should hold?
Recent research carried out by Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan
(2003), and Faulkender (2002) has focused on the role of firm–specific char-
acteristics such as leverage, growth opportunities, cash flow, and cash flow
uncertainty as the main determinants of corporate cash holdings. These re-
searchers find that firms that are small and non–rated hold more cash than
large firms. One can interpret these findings to suggest that firms facing a
high degree of asymmetric information are likely to hold more cash because of
potential difficulties in their access to external financing.
In addition to firm–specific variables, macroeconomic aggregates could be
an important determinant of firms’ cash–holding behavior, and one that has
received little attention in previous research. Our methodology is based on an
analytical prediction: the cross–sectional distribution of non–financial firms’
cash–to–asset ratios should be systematically affected by the degree of macroe-
conomic uncertainty. Under this hypothesis, the second moments matter:
for any given trajectory of monetary policy, firms will behave more homo-
geneously, and the cross–sectional distribution of cash/asset ratios will narrow
in the presence of heightened macroeconomic uncertainty.
We utilise a cash buffer–stock model augmented with a signal extraction
framework, where a non–financial firm’s manager adjusts her cash holdings to
minimize the expected costs of cash management. The model implies that the
manager will alter her cash holdings in anticipation of variations in macroe-
conomic shocks. The Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual
database of U.S. non-financial firms is used for testing our hypothesis. It covers
on average 3,600 firms’ annual characteristics from 1957 to 2000.
According to our empirical estimations we find that non–financial firms be-
come more homogeneous in their behavior in response to an increase in macroe-
conomic uncertainty, behaving more conservatively with respect to their cash
holdings in more uncertain times. Large firms, durable–goods makers, high–
growth firms and firms facing financial constraints make larger adjustments
in their cash holdings in response to macroeconomic volatility. These results
are shown to be robust to the inclusion of the levels of macroeconomic factors
such as the index of leading indicators and the rate of inflation.
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The Impact of Macroeconomic Uncertainty
on Cash Holdings for Non–Financial Firms
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of macroeconomic volatility
on non–financial firms’ cash holding behavior. Using an augmented
cash buffer–stock model, we demonstrate that an increase in macroe-
conomic volatility will cause the cross–sectional distribution of firms’
cash–to–asset ratios to narrow. We test this prediction on a panel of
non–financial firms drawn from the annual COMPUSTAT database
covering the period 1957–2000, and find that as macroeconomic un-
certainty increases, firms behave more homogeneously. Our results are
shown to be robust to the inclusion of the levels of several macroeco-
nomic factors.
Keywords: Cash holdings, macroeconomic uncertainty, time series, ARCH,
non–financial firms.
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1 Introduction
Some recent quotations indicate that non–financial firms maintain very large
cash holdings. For example, Apple Computer reported in October, 2002:
“For the year, the Company reported net earnings of $65 million on revenues
of $5.74 billion, compared to a net loss of $25 million on revenues of $5.36
billion in 2001... We were extremely pleased with our ability to achieve our
revenue target for the fourth quarter while reducing channel inventory to a
normal level... Continued strong asset management enabled us to maintain
a solid balance sheet with over $4.3 billion in cash...”1 How prevalent is this
cash–hoarding behavior?
Kester (1986), studying a sample of 452 US firms in 1983, reported that
their average ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets is 8.6%;
later Kim et al. (1998) reported an average of 8.1% for a sample of 915
US industrial firms over 1975–1994. In our sample of COMPUSTAT firms,
the average cash–to–asset ratio for all non–financial firms over the last 48
years is 11.9% with a significant difference between large and small firms’
ratios, 8.7% versus 14.3%, respectively. Why do firms hold these levels of
liquid assets? Over the years, many researchers have asked similar questions
and provided various explanations. One potential explanation is that cash
provides low–cost finance in a world with financial market imperfections and
failures. Therefore, firms would want to hold cash far in excess of their
transactions needs to mitigate the effects of unfavorable changes in interest
rates or restrictions on their access to credit. In essence, these high levels of
liquid assets may be viewed as options purchased by the firms’ managers that
may be exercised in adverse times (via drawdowns) to ensure the long–term
1Citation (emphasis added): Fred Anderson, CFO, in Apple Computer Inc. press
release, 16 October 2002, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2002/oct/16earnings.html
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survival of the firm as a going concern.
Recent research carried out by Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan
(2003), and Faulkender (2002) has focused on the role of firm–specific char-
acteristics such as leverage, growth opportunities, cash flow, and cash flow
uncertainty as the main determinants of corporate cash holdings.2 They
found that small, non–rated firms and firms with strong investment oppor-
tunities and riskier cash flows hold more cash. One can interpret these find-
ings to suggest that firms facing a high degree of asymmetric information
are likely to hold more cash because of potential difficulties in their access
to external financing.
In addition to firm–specific variables, macroeconomic aggregates could
be an important determinant of firms’ cash–holding behavior and one that
has received little attention in previous research.3 In this paper, we aim
to contribute to the literature on corporate cash holdings by arguing that
volatility in macroeconomic conditions would affect managers’ determination
of the appropriate level of liquid asset holdings. Hence, a firm facing higher
uncertainty in its cash flows may find it optimal to accumulate liquid assets,
in the form of cash, in order to offset the adverse effects of negative cash
flow shocks. Given that all managers will face this choice to a greater or
lesser degree, we expect that changes in macroeconomic stability will trigger
adjustments in firms’ liquid assets holdings as managers react to volatile
economic conditions. Naturally, this would in turn generate variations in the
cross–sectional distribution of corporate cash holdings.
To explore the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ cash hold-
2Other related papers include Almeida et al. (2004) and Dittmar et al. (2003).
3One exception is the work of Almeida et al. (2004), which examined firms’ cash
flow sensitivity of cash holdings over the business cycle. Additionally, views of a broad
“credit channel” have considered the sensitivity of firms’ net worth and creditworthiness
to macroeconomic factors.
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ing behavior, we construct a simple cash–buffer model augmented with a
signal extraction framework. The model generates a testable hypothesis:
one should observe a negative link between macroeconomic uncertainty and
variation in the cross sectional distribution of firms’ cash–to–asset ratios.
Increasing macroeconomic uncertainty will hinder managers’ ability to accu-
rately forecast future cash flows, leading them to behave more conservatively.
This will cause the dispersion of the cross–sectional cash–to–asset ratio to
fall. Conversely, in times of greater macroeconomic stability, managers will
be able to produce more accurate forecasts of cash flows, allowing them to
have more latitude to behave idiosyncratically, leading to a broadening of
the cross–sectional dispersion of firms’ cash–to–asset ratios.
Our modeling and empirical strategy differ from the prevalent approach
that generally links the level (or the changes) of firms’ cash holdings to vari-
ous firm–specific characteristics in order to explain the cash holding behavior
for the representative firm. In contrast, our approach allows one to under-
stand the cash holding behavior of the entire group of firms under scrutiny
rather than that of the representative firm. We should point out that al-
though different, these two methodologies are not contradictory; rather, they
are complementary analyses. Our strategy also differs from that of much of
the literature by allowing us to study the much–debated (but never properly
tested) hypothesis that macroeconomic uncertainty affects firms’ cash hold-
ing behavior. To ascertain the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the
cross–sectional distribution of firms’ cash–to–asset ratios, we utilize a panel
of non–financial firms obtained from the COMPUSTAT database over the
1957–2000 period. Our data set contains over 200,000 firm–years, with an
average of 3,600 firms per annum.4
4Considering the fact that the COMPUSTAT database covers the strongest and the
largest firms in the US economy, generalizing our observations as typical of corporate
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We can summarize our results as follows. The data yield a clear nega-
tive relationship between the variance of the cross–sectional distribution of
non–financial firms’ cash–to–asset ratios and a proxy for macroeconomic un-
certainty, the conditional variance of real gross domestic product. In our
regression analysis, we incorporate several additional variables to gauge the
robustness of our findings and guard against potential misspecification of
the model. Our analysis provides evidence that the relationship is robust to
inclusion of these variables.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of the influence of macroeconomic uncertainty on the optimal cash
holdings of non–financial firms. Section 3 describes the data and discusses
our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and gives suggestions for further
research.
2 Cash holdings under uncertainty
Some non–financial corporations hold significant amounts of cash equaling a
considerable fraction of their annual turnover.5 Why do firms hold a signif-
icant fraction of their assets in the form of cash? There has been extensive
literature on corporate cash holding, going back to Keynes (1936). He sug-
gests three major motives for cash holdings: (1) the transactions motive, (2)
the precautionary motive and (3) the speculative motive. In general, a firm
will hold cash to meet its transaction needs that would arise in the course of
carrying out its daily business activities. The precautionary motive requires
behavior might be considered reasonable.
5One may recall a well publicized dispute in 1996 between Robert J. Eason, the Chair-
man of Chrysler Corporation, and the investor Kirk Kerkorian over the latter’s proposal for
the distribution of cash and marketable securities in excess of $7.5 billion to shareholders
in the form of share repurchases and dividends.
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that a firm will accumulate cash to meet its unanticipated contingencies that
may arise, while the speculative motive argues that a firm will accumulate
cash to take advantage of profit-making opportunities that may develop.6
Recent research (see, for example, Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) and references
therein) has emphasized the importance of firm–specific characteristics as a
determinant of firms’ cash–holding behavior. However, the macroeconomic
environment within which firms operate could be an equally important de-
terminant. For instance, in March, 2001, Business Week reported: “So with
the economy stalling and fears of recession rising, executives are becoming
more concerned about protecting the cash they’ve got. ‘People are more
conservative than they were a year ago,’ says Charles G. Ward III, co-head
of investment banking at Credit Suisse First Boston. ‘CEOs and CFOs are
making sure they have bank lines and cash, and they want to make sure cap-
ital expenditures don’t outstrip their cash-raising capability.’ Adds Richard
H. Brown, CEO of technology–services giant Electronic Data Systems Corp.:
‘Cash is king now.’ ”7 This quotation suggests that managers, finding it
difficult to accurately forecast their firm’s future cash flows in a context of
increasing macroeconomic uncertainty, may decide to increase their firms’
cash holdings due to precautionary reasons. Such a conservative response on
the part of all managers would lead to a reduction in the cross–sectional dis-
persion of firms’ cash–to–asset ratios. Conversely, macroeconomic stability
provides managers with the ability to more accurately forecast their firms’
6One would expect stronger motives for corporate cash holdings to appear in an imper-
fect financial market, where external finance involves a high premium. Adverse selection
and moral hazard problems stemming from information asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers would lead to costly external financing. Thus, firms—particularly those with
a high degree of informational asymmetry–would tend to accumulate more cash to avoid
high costs of external finance.
7Citation: Business Week, 12 March 2001. “In Today’s Corporate America, Cash Is
King.” http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01 11/b3723021.htm.
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future cash flows and will give them the latitude to behave more idiosyncrat-
ically.
Surprisingly, to our knowledge there is no study which explicitly considers
the influence of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ demand for liquidity.
However, in a related context, Beaudry et al. (2001) investigated the effects
of monetary uncertainty on firms’ fixed investment behavior, while Baum et
al. (2002) considered the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on commer-
cial banks’ lending activity. In particular, Beaudry et al. presented a simple
macro model to illustrate the effects of monetary instability on the cross–
sectional dispersion of fixed investment. Using a panel of UK manufacturing
firms over the period 1970–1990, they showed that an increase in uncertainty,
as captured by the variance of the CPI, narrows the distribution of firms’ in-
vestment rates. In a similar vein, Baum et al. (2002) developed a model
to demonstrate existence of a negative relationship between macroeconomic
uncertainty and the cross–sectional variance of US banks’ loan–to–asset ra-
tios. They provided evidence in favor of their hypothesis using a panel of
quarterly bank data derived from the Federal Reserve System’s Commercial
Bank and Bank Holding Company database over 1979–2000. In both studies,
the authors ensured the robustness of their results by incorporating various
additional variables to their basic model that can affect the relationship.
In this paper, we argue that a firm facing higher uncertainty in its cash
flows may find it optimal to behave more conservatively with respect to its
cash holdings for precautionary reasons, as explained above. Given that all
managers are faced with a similar problem, adjustments in liquid assets in
turn generate predictable variations in the cross–sectional distribution of cor-
porate cash holdings. To provide a basis for our hypothesis and our empirical
work, we present a basic cash buffer–stock model augmented with a signal
8
extraction framework. For tractability, our model only contains the basic
building blocks required to link the dispersion of firms’ cash–to–total assets
ratio to macroeconomic variability. In our empirical work, similar to Beaudry
et al. and Baum et al., we incorporate several additional variables to gauge
the robustness of our findings and guard against potential misspecification
of the model.
2.1 The model
A straightforward cash buffer–stock model augmented with a signal extrac-
tion framework, where a non–financial firm’s manager adjusts her cash hold-
ings to minimize the expected costs of cash management, implies that the
manager will alter her cash holdings in anticipation of variations in macroe-
conomic shocks.8 Initially, we assume that the firm’s cash flow is uniformly
distributed, while the upper and lower bound of the distribution are known
to the manager and are identical across all firms. We show that the op-
timal amount of cash holdings will crucially depend on the bounds of the
distribution, as well as the opportunity cost of holding cash and the cost
of borrowing. Then, we allow these bounds to be subjected to a random
shock.9 Augmenting the basic model with a signal extraction framework, we
then show that the manager’s ability to accurately predict future cash flow
is important. Using this aspect of the model, we link the variance of the
cross–sectional distribution of firms’ cash–to–asset ratios to macroeconomic
uncertainty.
8Models developed by Whalen (1966), Schnure (1998), and Frenkel and Jovanovic
(1980) motivate our analytical approach.
9This assumption provides that cash holdings across firms are no longer identical.
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2.1.1 The basic cash buffer–stock model
Assume that in each period, firm i receives an uncertain amount of net cash
flow10 between time t and t + 1, drawn from a uniform distribution with an
upper bound H, and a lower bound, L = −H. The manager of the firm,
seeking to continue its operations, would want to hold an optimal amount
of cash buffer for precautionary reasons, which involves an opportunity cost
of r1 percent. If there is a negative cash flow shock that exceeds current
cash holdings, the firm has to borrow from an external source to meet its
obligations at a higher interest rate of r2 percent. We assume that r2 > r1,
and possibly r2 >> r1. Here, a firm holding a cash buffer of Ci faces the
following three possible outcomes.
First, the net cash flow of the firm could be positive, so that the firm
merely faces the opportunity cost of holding Ci
11
COST1 = Cir1, (1)
with probability P1 =
H
2H
= 1
2
.
Second, the firm could face a negative cash shock (CFi) of a magnitude
up to Ci. The cost now includes the opportunity cost of holding the cash
buffer as well as the cost of replenishing it:
COST2 = Cir1 − E(CFi| − Ci < CFi < 0) = Cir1 − −Ci
2
, (2)
which occurs with a probability of P2 =
Ci
2H
.
Finally, as the third case, the firm may not have enough cash to cover the
negative shock and has to borrow from external sources at a higher interest
10We assume that the firm has certain cash outflows, but that inflows are random in
their timing (e.g. invoices will be paid, but may be paid in a later accounting period than
that in which they are due.)
11Any unused cash is assumed to be distributed back to the shareholders in the form of
dividends or share repurchases.
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rate to remain solvent:12
COST3 = Cir1 + Ci − (E(CFi| −H < CFi < −Ci) + Ci)(1 + r2) =
= Cir1 + Ci +
(
H − Ci
2
)
(1 + r2). (3)
In this case, the firm bears the full opportunity cost Cir1 and must fully
replenish its cash buffer to the optimal level Ci. Furthermore, the firm bor-
rows an additional amount from an external source at the gross interest rate
(1 + r2), with a probability of P3 =
H−Ci
2H
.
Therefore, given all possible costs associated with holding cash as ex-
pressed in equations 1–3, the manager of the firm would want to minimize
its total expected cost, ECOST = COST1P1+COST2P2+COST3P3, which
takes the following form after some manipulation:
ECOST =
1
2
Cir1 +
(
Cir1 − −Ci
2
)
Ci
2H
+
(
Cir1 + Ci +
(
H − Ci
2
)
(1 + r2)
)
H − Ci
2H
. (4)
The first order conditions imply that the optimal cash buffer will be13
Ci =
H
r2
(r2 − 2r1). (5)
Observe that the optimal cash buffer for each firm depends positively on
the fixed bound, H, of the distribution from which cash flow is drawn and
the interest rate for external funds, r2 and negatively on the opportunity cost
of holding funds captured by r1. Note that the firm is guaranteed to have
positive cash holdings if r2 > 2r1. Also note that when the managers have
12To simplify the argument, we do not consider the likelihood of liquidation and assume
that the firm can borrow from an external source. Since in the empirical implementation
we work with large, publicly traded firms, this should be generally reasonable.
13The second order condition, ∂
2ECOST
∂C2
i
= r22H > 0, confirms that we have a minimum.
11
full information on the bounds of the cash flow distribution, each firm holds
an identical amount of cash. However, in real life, this is hardly the case.14
2.1.2 The augmented cash buffer–stock model
Let us now assume that each firm experiences a random shock to their cash
flow of the size i,t. In this context, i,t represents the level of uncertainty
of net disbursements that is faced by each firm. We assume that i,t is
distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ2,t across all firms,
15 implying
that the bounds of the cash flow distribution will now be random. Hence, the
upper bound of the cash flow for each firm i will be equal to Hi,t = H + i,t.
Let us further assume that manager of each firm at time t observes a signal
Si,t = i,t + νt where νt denotes noise, which is normally distributed as νt ∼
N(0, σ2ν,t) and independent of i,t. The noise in the signal is assumed to reflect
macroeconomic uncertainty, in the sense that a larger variance of νt makes
the manager unable to accurately predict the bounds of the distribution,
as would higher uncertainty in the economy. Contrarily, greater stability of
macroeconomic conditions would allow one to make accurate predictions of
the bounds of the distribution.
By employing the above framework, we assume that the manager takes
all available information into consideration before making any decision to
minimize the cost of holding a cash buffer–stock. Although the manager can
still make suboptimal decisions (as the information content of the signal tends
to change over time), the presence of the additional information contained in
14One can argue that in reality interest rates faced by each firm will differ across firms
leading to differences across firms with respect to their cash buffer. In the next section
we will provide another rationale for this heterogeneity without resorting to (generally
unobservable) firm–specific costs of borrowing.
15This approach captures the idea that probability of observing small shocks is higher
than that of larger ones.
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Si,t makes it possible to improve upon the na¨ıve prediction of a zero value for
i,t. After conditioning upon the signal Si,t, the manager forms an optimal
forecast of the range of net disbursements as Et(i,t|Si,t) = λtSi,t, where λt =
Cov(i,t|Si,t)/V ar(Si,t) = σ
2
,t
σ2,t+σ
2
ν,t
. Therefore, substituting for Et(Hi,t|Si,t) =
H + λtSi,t, we can modify equation (5) as:
E(Ci,t|Si,t) = (H + λtSi,t)(r2 − 2r1
r2
) = kH + kλtSi,t, (6)
where k = ( r2−2r1
r2
) > 0, so that optimal cash holdings Ci,t are positive as
long as r2 > 2r1. The difference of this new optimal cash level and that given
in equation (5) is in the second term: kλtSi,t. As macroeconomic uncertainty
increases, λt will diminish and equation (6) will no longer differ from equation
(5). However, if the economic environment is stable, then the manager will
be better off using equation (6). Although equation (6) does not yield an
estimable equation in levels as it contains the idiosyncratic signal Si,t, we may
still exploit it to compute the cross–sectional distribution of cash holdings
for each period:
V ar(Ci,t|Si,t) = k2λ2tV ar(Si,t) =
k2σ4,t
σ2,t + σ
2
ν,t
. (7)
This equation relates the cross–sectional variance of firms’ cash holdings to
macroeconomic uncertainty. If the macroeconomic situation becomes less
predictable or “noisier” (i.e., when σ2ν,t becomes large), the firms behave more
conservatively, leading to a narrowing in the cross–sectional distribution:
∂V ar(Ci,t|Si,t)
∂σ2ν,t
= − k
2σ4H,t
(σ2H,t + σ
2
ν,t)2
< 0. (8)
To provide support for our hypothesis as displayed in equation (8), we
investigate the link between macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in the
cross–sectional distribution of the cash–to–asset ratio for U.S. non–financial
13
firms. We expect to find that the spread of the distribution of the cash–
to–asset ratio—that is, the heterogeneity exhibited by non–financial firms’
behavior—will be negatively related to macroeconomic uncertainty. To test
our hypothesis, we consider the following reduced form equation:
Dispt(Cit/TAit) = β0 + β1τ
2
t + t, (9)
where Dispt(Cit/TAit) is a measure of the cross–sectional dispersion of firms’
cash–to–asset ratio at time t, and τ 2t stands for the measure of macroeconomic
uncertainty at time t. We would expect to find a negative sign on β1 if greater
macroeconomic uncertainty was associated with a smaller dispersion of firms’
cash–to–asset ratio.
In the model we derive heterogeneous behavior across non-financial firms
from purely stochastic elements. However, in reality we might expect that
different classes of firms respond differently to shocks. In the empirical analy-
sis, we consider subgroups of firms with various defining characteristics (size,
growth rate, product mix, financial constraints) to verify this expectation.
2.2 Identifying macroeconomic uncertainty
In order to test our hypothesis that there exists a negative relationship be-
tween the cross sectional variance of firms’ cash–to–asset ratio and macroe-
conomic uncertainty, we must provide a proxy that captures the state of the
macroeconomy. To provide such a proxy we compute the conditional vari-
ance of a monthly measure of real gross domestic product as a measure of
overall macroeconomic activity.16 The conditional variance of real GDP is
16Real GDP is available at a quarterly frequency; we use the proportional Denton pro-
cedure to generate a monthly series, using the index of industrial production (which is
available at a monthly frequency) as an interpolating variable.
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well suited for our purposes to measure the stability of the macroeconomy.17
Therefore, we rewrite equation (9) in the following form:
Dispt(Cit/TAit) = β0 + β1hˆt + t, (10)
where hˆt denotes the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty, captured by
the conditional variance of real GDP evaluated at time t. The advantage of
this approach is that we can relate the behavior of cash holdings directly to
a measurable variable for economic uncertainty.
Our proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty is derived from quarterly real
GDP (International Financial Statistics series 99BRZF ) and monthly in-
dustrial production (International Financial Statistics series 66IZF ). We
generated the monthly GDP series using the proportional Denton procedure
dentonmq (Baum, 2001), and fit a generalized ARCH (GARCH(2,2)) model
to the deviations of the series from an exponential trend, where the mean
equation is an AR(1) model.18 The conditional variance derived from this
GARCH model, averaged to annual frequency, is then used as our measure
of macroeconomic uncertainty (hˆt).
19
17Results using the conditional variance of industrial production were strong and similar
to those obtained from the conditional variance of real GDP. Since the latter measure
captures overall economic activity, we present only those results.
18To save space, details of the estimated GARCH model are not presented here but are
available upon request.
19Since hˆt is a generated regressor, potentially measured with error, we employ a gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) instrumental variables estimation technique. Tests
of the orthogonality of the generated regressor to the error (the “difference in Hansen J”
or “C” statistic: see Baum et al. (2003, pp. 20–24)) reject their null hypothesis in almost
every case. In contrast, the overidentifying restrictions are generally accepted following
the GMM estimation.
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3 Empirical findings
3.1 The data
The COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual database of U.S. non–financial firms
is used for testing our hypothesis. It covers on average 3,600 firms’ annual
characteristics from 1957 to 2000. The firms are classified by four-digit Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We consider all firms outside of
one–digit codes 6 (finance, insurance and real estate) and 9 (government
enterprises), and two–digit code 49 (utilities). We utilize COMPUSTAT
data items Cash (data1) and Total Assets (data6) to construct the Cash–to–
Asset ratio.20 In order to evaluate the severity of firms’ financial constraints,
we compute the dividend payout ratio as data21
data13−data15−data16 , where data21,
data13, data15 and data16 correspond to Dividends–Common, Operating
Income before Depreciation, Interest Expense and Income Taxes–Total re-
spectively.
We apply a number of sample selection criteria on our original sample of
201,143 firm–years. First, we marked non–positive values of cash and total
assets as missing. Second, we considered that values of the cash–to–asset
ratio beyond three standard deviations from the mean were implausible; this
only affected 5,352 firm-years, placing an effective upper bound on the cash–
to–asset ratio of 0.72. Third, our model should be applied to firms who have
not undergone substantial changes in their composition during the sample
period (e.g., participation in a merger, acquisition or substantial divestment
should be disqualifying). Since we do not directly observe these phenomena,
we calculate the growth rate of each firm’s real total assets, and trim the
annual distribution of this growth rate by the 10th and 90th percentiles to
20Empirical results obtained using an alternative measure, the Cash–to–Non–Cash–
Asset ratio, are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
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remove firms exhibiting substantial changes in their scale. Fourth, we wish to
exclude firms in clear financial distress or those facing substantial liquidity
constraints. We consider two years of negative cash flows as an indicator
of these conditions. Where these appear, we remove them as well as the
prior and subsequent cash flows from the sample. These screens collectively
reduced the sample to 153,690 firm–years.21
Descriptive statistics for the annual means of cash–to–asset ratios are
presented in Table 1. From the means of the sample we see that firms hold
almost 12 percent of their total assets in cash. We also split our dataset on
large and small firms. A firm is considered to be LARGE if its total assets are
above the 90th percentile by year, and SMALL if its total assets are below the
25th percentile for that year.22 There are significant differences in behavior
between large and small firms, with large firms having cash–to–assets ratio
5.6 percent lower than that of small firms. This can be explained by the fact
that large firms have easier access to external financing, and they may face
economies of scale in cash management.
On the basis of firms’ SIC codes, we subdivided the data of the manu-
facturing sector firms (two–digit SIC 20–39) into producers of durable goods
and producers of non–durable goods. A firm is considered DURABLE if its
primary SIC code is 24, 25, or 32–39.23 SIC codes for NON–DURABLE in-
dustries are 20–23 and 26–31.24 We find that manufacturers of durable and
21Empirical results drawn from the full sample yielded qualitatively similar findings;
we prefer to use the screened data to reduce the potential impact of outliers upon the
parameter estimates.
22These asymmetric bounds have been chosen, given the highly skewed distribution of
firms’ assets, in order to roughly equalize the number of firm–years in each category.
23These industries include lumber and wood products, furniture, stone, clay, and glass
products, primary and fabricated metal products, industrial machinery, electronic equip-
ment, transportation equipment, instruments, and miscellaneous manufacturing indus-
tries.
24These industries include food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing
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non–durable goods have average cash–to–asset ratios differing by 0.8 percent.
We divided firms into high–growth and low–growth categories, defining
those categories as above the 75th percentile and below the 25th percentile
of the annual distribution of the growth in real total assets, respectively. We
find that high–growth firms hold, on average, 0.8 percent more cash relative
to total assets than do low–growth firms.
We also analysed the distinction between firms that might be consid-
ered financially constrained and those that might be considered financially
unconstrained. Following the literature, we used the dividend payout ratio
as a measure of financial stringency, defining those firms which lay below
the 25th percentile of the annual distribution—or those firms paying zero
dividends—to be financially constrained.25 We defined those firms above the
75th percentile of the annual distribution of the dividend payout ratio to be
financially unconstrained. We find that the average cash–to–asset ratios of
financially constrained and unconstrained firms differ by 1.3 percent, with
the latter firms holding more cash.
3.2 The link between cash holdings and uncertainty
The results of estimating Equation (10) are given in Tables 2–10 for all firms
and four category splits (large/small, durable/non–durable goods manufac-
turers, low and high growth firms, and financially constrained/unconstrained
firms, respectively). In those tables, we present GMM (instrumental variables–
generalized method of moments) estimation results,26 where the macroeco-
and publishing, chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber and plastics, and leather
products makers.
25There is a notable trend toward lower dividend payout ratios during the period of
analysis, so that even the median firm had a zero payout ratio after 1985.
26The rationale for this approach is discussed above in section 2.2.
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nomic uncertainty proxy Lwcvgdp is a weighted average of lagged effects.27,28
Column (2) of each table presents results of regressions adding two control
variables: the rate of CPI inflation and the detrended index of leading indi-
cators (computed from DRI–McGraw Hill Basic Economics series DLEAD),
to check for stability of our results in the presence of these factors, reflecting
level effects from the macroeconomic environment. We consider the poten-
tial impact of interest rates on cash–holding behavior in columns (3) and (4),
which include the three–month Treasury bill rate (TB3mo) and the three–
month LIBOR rate, LIBOR3mo, as a proxy for the private cost of funds.
Column (5) combines the variables added in column (2) with LIBOR3mo,
which is the more successful interest rate variable. The last two rows of each
table report ηˆ, the estimated elasticities of the dispersion of the cash/asset
ratio with respect to Lwcvgdp, and their estimated standard errors, labelled
“s.e.”.
The results indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship
between the cross–sectional distribution of non–financial firms’ cash–to–asset
ratios and a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. For all firms, as presented
in Table 2, the elasticities with respect to the macroeconomic uncertainty
measures are similar across the specifications, and each significantly differs
from zero. These results support the model, with the proxy for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty having sizable and stable effects.
There are interesting differences in the results for large and small firms,
as presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The findings for large firms have
27We imposed an arithmetic lag on the values of the proxy variable for periods t−1, t−2,
t−3 and t−4, with weights 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 respectively, to capture the combined effect
of contemporaneous and lagged uncertainty on cash holding behavior. Analysis based on
contemporaneous and once–lagged uncertainty yielded similar results..
28Use of similar measures based on the conditional variance of industrial production as
a regressor yielded qualitatively similar results. These are available from the authors upon
request.
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similar explanatory power to those for all firms, with estimated elasticities
even larger than their counterparts in Table 2. In contrast, the elasticities for
small firms exhibit about half as much sensitivity to macroeconomic uncer-
tainty, with lower levels of significance. This difference may be due to the fact
that small firms hold significantly larger amounts of cash than their larger
counterparts, who are likely to enjoy better access to credit markets. Hence,
our regression results imply that small firms find more room to maneuver
during turbulent periods in comparison to larger firms.
A quite striking contrast may be observed between durable–goods makers
(Table 5) and non–durable goods manufacturers (Table 6). The former firms
have a marked sensitivity to macroeconomic uncertainty, with estimated elas-
ticities considerably larger than those for all firms or even for large firms.
In contrast, non–durable goods makers exhibit much lower sensitivities to
macroeconomic uncertainty.29 This distinction can be better understood by
noting that non–durable goods producers are expected to have lower levels
of finished goods inventories compared to durable goods producers. Since
durable goods makers’ products generally involve greater time lags in pro-
duction and larger inventories of work–in–progress, they will behave more
conservatively in their cash holdings policy to overcome the potential dif-
ficulties involved in times of higher uncertainty than will the non–durable
goods producers.
Low–growth firms (reported in Table 7) are likely to be more mature firms,
perhaps those in declining industries. They exhibit significant effects, with
generally smaller estimated elasticities than those for all firms. In contrast,
the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on high–growth firms (as reported
29Joint estimation of the two equations as a SUR system allows for a test of equality of
the column (5) estimates for Lwcvgdp. This test rejects at any conventional significance
level, indicating that durable firms’ sensitivity is significantly greater.
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in Table 8) is about twice as large. These firms—likely to be younger firms
with substantial uncertainty about their near–term prospects—are consid-
erably more sensitive to macroeconomic factors. Furthermore, one would
expect that their access to external finance may be limited, requiring them
to behave more cautiously, particularly in times of higher macroeconomic
uncertainty.
The results for financially constrained versus unconstrained firms are
quite striking (see tables 9 and 10, respectively), with the model having
much lower explanatory power for the latter group of firms. For the finan-
cially constrained firms, the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty are quite
substantial, with sizable estimated elasticities comparable to the effects noted
for high–growth firms. This result is also quite intuitive. As uncertainty
in the macroeconomic environment increases, financially constrained firms
would want to accumulate larger cash buffers to weather the storm while
the unconstrained firms can be expected to have more latitude to behave
idiosyncratically.
In summary, we find support for the model’s predictions for the entire
set of firms considered, and find, as well, that the model is more strongly
supported for some categories of firms than for others. Not surprisingly,
the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty differ with respect to firm–specific
characteristics. Large firms with substantial exposure to macro demand con-
ditions exhibit greater sensitivity. Since durable goods makers’ products gen-
erally involve greater time lags in production and larger inventories of work–
in–progress, they are also more sensitive to macroeconomic uncertainty than
are nondurable–goods producers. Firms experiencing rapid growth—often
a synonym for young firms with substantial uncertainty over their eventual
prospects—and firms that might be considered financially constrained are
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found to be quite sensitive to macroeconomic uncertainty. Finally, firms
that are paying sizable dividends, and might be considered free of financial
constraints, do not exhibit sensitivity to these macro effects.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we focus on the link between the dispersion of firms’ cash–
to–assets ratios and macroeconomic uncertainty using a panel of U.S. non–
financial firms. Based on an augmented cash buffer–stock model, we demon-
strate that firms become more homogeneous in their cash–holding behavior
in response to an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty. Conversely, when
the macroeconomic environment is more stable, firms have more latitude to
behave idiosyncratically, leading to a broadening of the cross–sectional dis-
persion of firms’ cash–to–asset ratios. To test the predictions of our model, we
estimate a simple reduced–form equation using an annual data set describ-
ing individual firms’ behavior and a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty
derived from monthly estimates of real GDP. On the basis of our empirical
findings, we suggest that large firms, durable–goods makers, high–growth
firms and financially constrained firms make larger adjustments in their cash
holdings in response to macroeconomic volatility than will smaller or more
slowly growing firms, those producing non–durable goods, or those who do
not face financial constraints. These results are shown to be robust to the
inclusion of the levels of macroeconomic factors such as the index of leading
indicators, the rate of inflation, and short–term Treasury and LIBOR interest
rates.
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Appendix: Construction of cash holdings and uncertainty
measures
The following variables are used in the empirical study.
From Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database:
DNUM: Industry Classification Code
DATA1: Cash Holdings
DATA6: Total Assets
DATA13: Operating Income before Depreciation
DATA15: Interest Expense
DATA16: Income Taxes–Total
DATA21: Dividends–Common
From International Financial Statistics:
66IZF: Industrial Production monthly
64XZF: Consumer Price Inflation
99BRZF: GDP at 1996 prices
From the DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics database:
DLEAD: index of leading indicators
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Table 1: Mean of Annual Cash/Asset ratios: Descriptive statistics
µ σ p25 p50 p75 N
All firms 0.119 0.029 0.099 0.114 0.128 153,690
Small firms 0.143 0.020 0.126 0.142 0.151 24,907
Large firms 0.087 0.032 0.069 0.074 0.097 19,270
Durable goods firms 0.121 0.033 0.092 0.121 0.137 55,351
Non–durable goods firms 0.113 0.028 0.090 0.104 0.141 33,576
Low–growth firms 0.112 0.021 0.092 0.110 0.132 29,636
High–growth firms 0.120 0.024 0.099 0.122 0.141 29,591
Financially constrained firms 0.113 0.022 0.093 0.112 0.123 70,932
Unconstrained firms 0.126 0.049 0.092 0.101 0.165 35,719
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while µ
and σ represent its mean and standard deviation. N refers to the number of
firm–years of data in each category which have been collapsed into 48 annual
observations (42 years for the growth categories).
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Table 2. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for all firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -168.659 -134.880 -184.806 -185.172 -149.364
[24.598]*** [24.167]*** [29.166]*** [32.380]*** [23.272]***
Inflation -0.003 -0.006
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
LeadIndic -0.003 -0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
TB3mo 0.163
[0.132]
LIBOR3mo 0.091 0.431
[0.108] [0.118]***
Constant 0.210 0.208 0.207 0.212 0.197
[0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -0.77 -0.61 -0.85 -0.85 -0.68
s.e. 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.12
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 153690 firm-year obs.
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Table 3. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -133.863 -101.122 -123.634 -120.773 -101.272
[16.317]*** [15.638]*** [19.888]*** [21.775]*** [14.039]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
LeadIndic -0.001 -0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]**
TB3mo -0.053
[0.086]
LIBOR3mo -0.070 0.080
[0.064] [0.073]
Constant 0.145 0.140 0.144 0.144 0.137
[0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -1.00 -0.73 -0.91 -0.89 -0.74
s.e. 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.12
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 19270 firm-year obs.
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Table 4. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for small firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -114.644 -89.415 -130.703 -140.800 -92.495
[22.407]*** [17.790]*** [24.224]*** [28.542]*** [21.112]***
Inflation -0.001 -0.004
[0.001] [0.001]***
LeadIndic -0.002 -0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
TB3mo 0.338
[0.100]***
LIBOR3mo 0.252 0.398
[0.078]*** [0.128]***
Constant 0.203 0.193 0.191 0.199 0.181
[0.012]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -0.44 -0.34 -0.50 -0.54 -0.35
s.e. 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.08
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 24907 firm-year obs.
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Table 5. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for durable–goods firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -231.626 -184.511 -250.524 -247.552 -206.708
[32.296]*** [34.639]*** [36.072]*** [40.398]*** [33.851]***
Inflation -0.004 -0.009
[0.001]*** [0.002]***
LeadIndic -0.004 -0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]**
TB3mo 0.241
[0.173]
LIBOR3mo 0.127 0.635
[0.146] [0.157]***
Constant 0.243 0.241 0.237 0.242 0.225
[0.013]*** [0.015]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -1.07 -0.84 -1.17 -1.14 -0.94
s.e. 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.17
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 55351 firm-year obs.
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Table 6. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for nondurable–goods firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -64.479 -42.984 -67.774 -69.713 -40.292
[15.139]*** [8.752]*** [16.453]*** [18.384]*** [9.002]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.004
[0.000]*** [0.001]***
LeadIndic -0.001 -0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
TB3mo 0.081
[0.093]
LIBOR3mo 0.037 0.264
[0.074] [0.062]***
Constant 0.139 0.137 0.135 0.139 0.126
[0.008]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -0.34 -0.22 -0.35 -0.36 -0.21
s.e. 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 33576 firm-year obs.
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Table 7. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for low–growth firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -116.977 -72.765 -114.998 -116.647 -84.195
[19.026]*** [16.704]*** [22.547]*** [24.924]*** [17.188]***
Inflation -0.003 -0.005
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
LeadIndic -0.001 -0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]
TB3mo 0.020
[0.110]
LIBOR3mo -0.002 0.283
[0.086] [0.087]***
Constant 0.164 0.154 0.161 0.164 0.148
[0.010]*** [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -0.63 -0.39 -0.62 -0.63 -0.45
s.e. 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.10
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 29636 firm-year obs.
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Table 8. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for high–growth firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -267.098 -190.969 -285.365 -296.038 -209.334
[38.274]*** [43.219]*** [44.121]*** [47.997]*** [45.002]***
Inflation -0.004 -0.008
[0.001]*** [0.002]***
LeadIndic -0.003 -0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]**
TB3mo 0.301
[0.192]
LIBOR3mo 0.182 0.517
[0.153] [0.200]***
Constant 0.269 0.247 0.257 0.269 0.235
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.016]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -1.16 -0.83 -1.28 -1.31 -0.92
s.e. 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.21
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 29591 firm-year obs.
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Table 9. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for financially constrained firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -194.170 -160.575 -219.221 -229.657 -155.202
[32.023]*** [24.451]*** [36.154]*** [41.144]*** [22.242]***
Inflation -0.002 -0.007
[0.001]** [0.001]***
LeadIndic -0.003 -0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]***
TB3mo 0.390
[0.146]***
LIBOR3mo 0.281 0.575
[0.119]** [0.136]***
Constant 0.227 0.221 0.215 0.226 0.196
[0.015]*** [0.009]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** [0.009]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -0.87 -0.71 -0.98 -1.02 -0.68
s.e. 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.11
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 70932 firm-year obs.
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Table 10. Dispersion of Cash/Asset ratio for financially unconstrained firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig RAT1 Sig
Lwcvgdp -43.670 -0.227 -33.312 -32.854 -4.318
[15.079]*** [9.699] [16.436]** [16.960]* [10.498]
Inflation -0.002 -0.002
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
LeadIndic -0.001 -0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
TB3mo -0.066
[0.067]
LIBOR3mo -0.074 0.008
[0.055] [0.048]
Constant 0.133 0.122 0.132 0.133 0.123
[0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]***
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
ηˆ -0.22 -0.00 -0.16 -0.16 -0.02
s.e. 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.05
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Estimation by IV–GMM. SD based on 35719 firm-year obs.
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